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The Public Employe Relations Act
and Pennsylvania Teachers: A Legal
Analysis in Light of the January,
1971 Pittsburgh Dispute
INTRODUCTION
On July 23, 1970 the Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act,'
popularly known as Act 195, was signed into law, thus supposedly
ushering into existence an age of enlightenment in the field of public
sector bargaining in Pennsylvania. However, the first major test of the
new law, which came during the contract negotiations between the
Pittsburgh School Board and the Pittsburgh Federation of Teachers,
seemed to indicate that the stated purpose of the Act, "to promote
orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers
and their employes, '" 2 was left singularly unfulfilled. It is the aim of
this comment to ascertain the reasons for that failure, and to recom-
mend corrective measures to avert a similar breakdown of the bargain-
ing process in the future.
THE JANUARY, 1971, PITTSBURGH SCHOOL DisPuTE
The Pittsburgh Federation of Teachers (hereinafter referred to as
the PFT), an American Federation of Labor affiliate, was selected as
the majority bargaining representative by the city's teachers in a rep-
resentation election conducted in the aftermath of a PFT led ten day
work stoppage-in March of 1968.3 The PFT and the Board had begun
contract negotiations in May of 1970, but had made minimal progress
prior to the terminal date of January 4, 1971. 4 PFT's demands included
a $1,300 a year boost in starting salaries, and the resolution of impor-
tant non-economic issues such as classroom size, discipline procedures,
and the initiation of special educational programs. 5
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 43, §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Supp. 1971).
2. Id. § 1101.101.
3. Pittsburgh Press, Jan. 3, 1971, at 1, col. 4.
4. Id, Jan. 2, 1971, at 3, col. 3.
5. Id. Jan. 3, 1971, at 4, col. 1.
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On January 4, 1971, a two week strike commenced, leaving 73,000
children out of school. The PFT had approximately 1,100 teachers
on the picket lines, a figure greater than the total number of teachers
who walked out during the 1968 strike. As the strike progressed, the
Board sought to implement mediation and fact finding under sections
8016 and 8027 of the Act. The Board also sought an injunction8 order-
ing the teachers back to work as provided for under section 1002.9
However, the strike was settled before the fact finding panel could do
any work, and before a hearing could be held on the injunction re-
quest.
The final package totaled $10 million and resulted in a $1,700 raise
for the teachers over a 23 month period. In addition, according to
PFT President Albert Fondy, "some progress was made in the area of
school board policy on hiring teachers and student discipline."'10 The
Board concessions were itemized to include: 1) the addition of 86
teachers to reduc the sieofcase;2+terpotn of student atten-
dance and assaults upon teachers to the Board in order to permit
comparisons among the various schools; 3) review by the Board of its
August 31 decision to phase out corporal punishment; 4) meetings with
the Board to work out "mutually agreed upon" discipline procedures
by February 1, 1971; 5) the establishment of a grievance procedure;
and, 6) recognition by the Board of the PFT as the single bargaining
agent for Pittsburgh teachers," as allowed under section 606 of the
Act.12
The purpose of this commentary is to analyze the implications of
the Pittsburgh dispute in future teacher-school board collective bar-
gaining in the areas of representation rights, scope of bargaining, the
efficacy of mediation and fact finding, and the effectiveness of the
sanctions under the Act for abuse of the limited right to strike.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.801 (Supp. 1971):
If after a reasonable period of negotiation, a dispute or impasse exists between the
representatives of the public employer and the public employes, the parties may vol-
untarily submit to mediation but if no agreement is reached between the parties
within twenty-one days after negotiations have commenced, but in no event later
than one hundred fifty days prior to the "budget submission date," and mediation
has not been utilized by the parties, both parties shall immediately, in writing, call
in the service of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation.
7. Id. § 1101.802 (Supp. 1971).
8. Pittsburgh Press; Jan. 18, 1971, at 13, col. 1-2.
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1002 (Supp. 1971).
10. Pittsburgh Press, Jan. 18, 1971, at 13, col. 1.
11. Id. at col. 1-2.
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.606 (Supp. 1971).
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EXCLUSIvE REPRESENTATION BY THE PFT
The January agreement stated that the Board officially recognized
the PFT as the single bargaining representative for all teachers in the
Pittsburgh Public School System. 13
The significance of this clause should not be underestimated, or
considered a pro forma acknowledgment of the PFT's victory in the
1969 runoff election with its rival teacher organization, the Pittsburgh
Teachers Education Association (hereinafter referred to as the PTEA).
Absent legislation enabling him to bargain collectively with organiza-
tions representing his employes, a public employer may engage in such
bargaining, but may not confer exclusive recognition on such a repre-
sentative. 14 Section 60615 of Act 195 permits exclusive recognition,
and 602(b)' permits it to be conferred without the requirement of an
election and certification, even though this would have been illegal
prior to its passage.' 7 Moreover, application of the contract bar provi-
sions of section 605(7)(i) will insure the PFT's continued majority
status for the duration of the two-year contract.' Thus, if the Board
were now to negotiate on wages, hours, terms or conditions of employ-
ment with the rival PTEA, it would be in violation of its statutory
duty to bargain only with the exclusive bargaining agent of its em-
ployes. 19 A cogent application of this principle is seen in the significant
decision of Board of School Directors v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Commission (W.E.R.C.). 2° The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held
that a public employer engages in prohibited collective bargaining
whenever he permits a representative of a minority union to speak on
negotiable subjects during the course of a public negotiation session.
In spite of this, it is foreseeable that Act 195 will be the source of
future conflict and litigation in the area of minority union rights.
Basically, the issues will involve the denial of due process and equal
protection to members of minority organizations. The fourteenth
13. Pittsburgh Press, Jan. 18, 1971, at 13, col. 2.
14. State Board of Regents v. United Packing House Food and Allied Workers, Local
1258, 175 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1970).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.606 (Supp. 1971).
16. Id. § 1101.602(b).
17. See note 14.
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.605(7)(i) (Supp. 1971).
19. Id. § 1101.1201(a)(5).
20. 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d 92 (1969).
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amendment requires that such restraints must be reasonably related to
a legitimate legislative purpose.21
It is submitted that section 70522 of the Act might give rise to con-
stitutional problems by permitting bargaining between a public em-
ployer and an exclusive representative over a dues checkoff provision.
Although the Pittsburgh contract did not contain such a clause, the
aforementioned case of Board of School Directors v. W.E.R.C., also
held that, in the context of teacher-board negotiations, bargaining for
a dues checkoff provision was impermissible since it was not reasonably
related to the function of the majority organization in its representative
capacity as the exclusive bargaining agent for all employes. 23 There-
fore, such a privilege must be granted equally to both the exclusive
representative and the minority union. The grant of a checkoff solely
to the majority union could only have the effect of encouraging the
self-perpetuation and entrenchment of the majority organization, to
the obviousc .triment of a minority union. This follows the lead of the
landmark decision of U.S. v. Robel,24 which sweepingly held that the
right of association, as protected by the first amendment, mandates that
statutes be drawn narrowly enough to avoid any conflict between
legislative power and individual rights. The duty of the states to afford
equal protection of the laws also carries over into its role as an
employer, where a zone of protection for minority rights must be
maintained. If the public employer does not choose the least drastic
step when discriminating between majority and minority groups of
employes, his action becomes arbitrary and unreasonable. Convenient
though an exclusive dues checkoff might be, the inhibitory effect
which it has on the associational rights of minority union members
cannot be justified in terms of being necessary to the functioning of
the majority union as the exclusive bargaining representative. To
adopt a standard of convenience in this area would directly contravene
the essential thrust of Robel, which specifically renounced the old
balancing standard in judging infringements on first amendment
rights. Thus, the trend indicated by Robel and W.E.R.C. may eventu-
21. For a general discussion see Note, The Privilege of Exclusive Recognition and
Minority Union Rights in Public Employment, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 1004 (1970).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Supp. 1971):
Membership dues deductions and maintenance of membership are proper subjects of
bargaining with the proviso that as to the latter, the payment of dues and assessments
while members, may be the only requisite employment condition.
23. 42 Wis. 2d 637, 648, 168 N.W.2d 92, 98 (1969).
24. 384 U.S. 258 (1967).
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ally find its way into Pennsylvania and give rise to complications
which the drafters of Act 195 probably never dreamed of. The uncon-
stitutionality of section 705 is one such possibility.
SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND MANAGEMENT
PREROGATIVES OF THE SCHOOL BOARD
It can confidently be stated that no other single issue has more
exacerbated teacher-board collective bargaining relations than has the
interpretation and application of the broad language of section 702
of the Act.25
Indeed, in light of the Pittsburgh dispute where educational reform
(or board policy, if you prefer) was the main stumbling block to a
peaceful settlement, 26 it can safely be said that Act 195 is nothing less
than an invitation to institutionalized chaos and bad-faith bargaining.
The reasons for this are readily discernible. The Act is intended to
cover all public employes. In the public sector generally, many non-
economic matters lie beyond the authority of the public employer and
require legislative enactment to effect a desired change. Examples of
this would be matters fixed by law, administrative regulation, or by
another state authority.27 Thus the public employer has less discretion
over management policy than does his private sector counterpart.
It is this potential conflict which section 702 was designed to meet by
specifically exempting nothing from the scope of public bargaining,
yet making permissive the discussion of matters of inherent managerial
policy. The sorry result in teacher-board bargaining to date has been
that the parties dissipate most of their bargaining time debating over
what should be bargainable.25 A stubborn board, jealous of its past
prerogatives in unilateral formulation of all aspects of educational
management, is sorely tempted to limit bargaining to little more than
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Supp. 1971):
Public employers shall not be required to bargain over matters of inherent manage-
rial policy, which shall include but shall not be limited to such areas of discretion or
policy as the functions and programs of the public employer, standards of service, its
overall budget, the utilization of technology, the organizational structure and selec-
tion and direction of personnel. Public employers, however, shall be required to meet
and discuss on policy matters affecting wages, hours and terms and conditions of em-
ployment as well as the impact thereon upon request by public employe representa-
tives.
26. Pittsburgh Press, Jan. 18, 1971, at 13, col. 1.
27. For a general discussion see Note, Pennsylvania's Proposed Public Employees Rela-
tions Act: A Landmark of Sound Progress or an Invitation to a Quagmire? 30 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 693 (1969).
28. Pittsburgh Press, Feb. 23, 1971, at 15, col. 1.
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wages and fringe benefits. This is due largely to the protective cloak
which section 702 seemingly provides to possible sanctions under
section 130129 for violation of the 1201(a)(5) refusal to bargain pro-
vision.30 This leaves teacher organizations with the unpalatable option
of either conceding to board dictates in non-economic matters or "hit-
ting the streets."
A strong argument can be made that the labor situation in public
education is unique. Most managerial issues in this area tend to be
local in nature and effect, thus not raising any substantial issues of
state sovereignty. For instance, the need for better disciplinary pro-
cedures, questions concerning optimum class sizes, and the necessity for
remedial programs geared to the needs of the local school district are
typical of those items which are best resolved at the local level.
In addition, an even stronger argument can be made that teachers,
as professional employes, should for both practical and equitable
reasons have a greater role in the formulation of management policy.
They should not be treated as hired hands to be paid their regular
stipend and shoved back into the blackboard jungle. Nor should they
be expected to produce in an educational environment over which they
have no control-in a calling which by its nature demands innovation
and ingenuity. For the state, in its role as public employer, to adopt as
its policy the permissive exclusion of the accumulated training and
practical experience of thousands of its most valuable professional
employes in the formulation of educational policy is both nonsensical
and dangerous.
Another factor to be considered is the inevitability that joint respon-
sibility for the successful execution of educational goals will soon be-
come the norm. Walter E. Oberer, a professor of law and industrial and
labor relations at Cornell University, has hypothesized that as teacher
collective bargaining results in improved compensation, employers and
taxpayers alike will begin demanding educational performance from
the teachers commensurate with their improved situation.3' The theory
that merit principles in teaching is the coming thing is evidenced by
the "accountability" provision in the three-year contract executed be-
tween New York City and the United Federation of Teachers in 1969.82
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1301 (Supp. 1971).
30. Id. § 1101.1201(a)(5).
31. Oberer, The Future of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 20 LAB. L.J.
777 (1969).
32. Id.
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In response to the failure to adequately educate academically retarded
minority groups, the parties stated that:
The Board and the union therefore agree to join in an effort, in
cooperation with universities, community school boards and
parent organizations, to seek solutions to this major problem and
to develop objective criteria of professional accountability (em-
phasis added).8 3
The relevance of this trend to the question of the proper scope of
teacher-board bargaining should be obvious. The rise of merit prin-
ciples as the quid pro quo for increased economic benefits implicitly
demands the surrender of both traditional management prerogatives
and the past insulation of the teaching profession from critical evalua-
tion. One can not, and should not, be held responsible for that which
he has no power to alter.
For these reasons, sections 70134 and 70235 of Act 195 must be con-
sidered fatally defective in making such items permissive subjects of
bargaining, voidable at the option of the board. It almost goes without
saying that the "meet and discuss" requirement36 regarding policy
matters will be ineffective so long as the board may "discuss" with no
sincere desire to reach an accord, which they must do when engaged in
actual bargaining.
It is submitted that Act 195 should be amended to specifically
mandate good faith bargaining between teachers and school boards
regarding matters of inherent managerial policy, at least insofar as the
boards have the power to alter such policy. This outside limit to the
bargaining duty has been previously suggested. 7
This proposal is not as radical as it might first appear. In the January,
33. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1969, at 27, col. 5.
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.701 (Supp. 1971) delimits the mandatory scope of
bargaining:
Collective bargaining is the performance of the mutual obligation of the public em-
ployer and the representative of the public employes to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement or any question arising thereunder
and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached but such
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making
of a concession.
35. Id. § 1101.702. For the text of this section see note 25.
36. Id. § 1101.301(17):
"Meet and discuss" means the obligation of the public employer upon request to
meet at reasonable times and discuss recommendations submitted by the representa-
tives of public employes: Provided, that any decisions or determinations on matters
so discussed shall remain with the public employer and be deemed final on any issue
or issues raised.
37. Supra note 27.
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1971 Pittsburgh contract, the board did agree to certain minimal edu-
cational reforms3 which can easily be said to fall within the permissive
area. The hiring of additional teachers to reduce class size and the
agreement over improved discipline procedure are two prime examples.
Secondly, it is fairly well settled that a public employer may treat
teachers as a separate class of public employes with different bargaining
rights, without risking the taint of constitutional invalidity.39 Thirdly,
the importance of non-economic issues in the bargaining process in
public education has been recognized elsewhere. A most notable
example is in Connecticut, where boards and teachers are under a duty
to bargain "with respect to salaries and other conditions of employ-
ment about which either party wishes to negotiate." 40 This duty speci-
fically includes discussions over the budget making process, an item
which goes straight to the core of traditional management rights. 41
Finally, there is the general approach taken by the courts in the private
sector, where waiver of the right to bargain over management decisions
is strictly construed so as not to undermine the bargaining duty.42
In summation, it appears that unless sections 701 to 706 are amended
to comport with the realities of public education, we are destined to suf-
fer periodic spasms of psychological warfare and dramatic power plays
in an effort to force agreement in an area where mutual accommodation
and collective decision making are compelled by logic, necessity, equity,
and precedent.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ACT 195: WHY No MEDIATION IN
THE PITTSBURGH DISPUTE?
The drafters of Act 195, faced with both the reality of the strike as
a tool in public employe bargaining and the need to avert critical work
stoppages in the public sector, armed the Act with extensive provisions
requiring resort to mediation and fact-finding prior to any strike. This
was to commence no later than twenty-one days after negotiations had
begun and no agreement had been reached.43 The Act prohibits strikes
38. Pittsburgh Press, Jan. 3, 1971, at 4, col. 1.
39. California Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Oxnard Elementary Schools, 272
Cal. App. 2d 514, 77 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1969).
40. CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 10, ch. 166, § 10-153(d) (Supp. 1969).
41. Id.
42. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company, 363
U.S. 574 (1960).
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.801 (Supp. 1971). For the text of this section see
note 6.
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during the pendency of these procedures and provides for injunctive
relief and fines if disregarded. 44
It will be recalled from the synopsis of facts that although the PFT
and the Board had been meeting since May of 1970, neither party
submitted the dispute to mediation until after the commencement of
the strike. The Board then attempted to implement fact-finding and
institute injunctive relief against the union. At that point, however,
the two-week stoppage affecting several thousand teachers and 73,000
school children had worn down resistance on both sides, and the dis-
pute was settled before the Act's provisions could be implemented. By
any objective criteria it can not be denied that Act 195 failed its initial
test in pre-strike settlement.
The PFT has attempted to explain this failure by suggesting that
the Act was inoperative during the negotiations. The argument goes as
follows. Bill 195 was enacted into law on July 23, 1970 but did not take
effect until ninety days later.45 October 22 was less than 150 days prior
to the Board's Budget Submission Date of December 6. Section 801 of
the Act states that mediation must begin "in no event" less than 150
days prior to that date.46 Therefore, the prohibition against a strike
prior to such mediation was inoperative.47
A more substantive reason for the failure of the Act in this
regard has already partially been suggested. As noted, the effect of
sections 701 and 702 of the Act has been to narrow the scope of manda-
tory bargaining to a degree completely repugnant to any self-respecting
teacher organization desirous of enhancing the professional status of
its members. In such a situation the incentive on both sides to invoke
mediation is practically non-existent. The mutual advantage in media-
tion is that it can provide an independent vehicle for settlement once
good faith bargaining has come to an impasse regarding items which
the parties must eventually agree upon. Mediation becomes a practical
necessity when parties, who are legally bound to bargain, cannot reach
an agreement yet wish to avoid the unpleasant consequences of a strike.
But when one of the parties has both the legal right and the expressed
44. Id. §§ 1101.1001-.1010.
45. Id. § 1101.2301.
46. Id. § 1101.801.
47. This argument is not particularly persuasive. First it is highly questionable reason-
ing to infer a legislative intent to absolutely prohibit the commencement of mediation
within the 150 day period. Secondly, for the PFT to seize upon such a dubious techni-
cality as a bar to mediation, months before the actual strike deadline, signifies at the
very least a less than wholehearted desire to settle the dispute amicably. As such, their
statutory construction of the Act should be viewed with a jaundiced eye.
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desire not to bargain on certain items, then in effect there is nothing
to mediate. This is precisely what occurred in the Pittsburgh dispute.
Viewed from this perspective the Board's persistent criticism of the
PFT for their failure to press for mediation prior to the strike would
seem to be off point, even if technically correct. The general rule in
collective bargaining is that once a party expresses a desire not to
negotiate over permissive subjects of bargaining, they must immedi-
ately be taken off the table, since the execution of an agreement cannot
be held up on account of them.48 In fact, refusal to do so constitutes a
breach of the duty to bargain in good faith. In light of this, the Pitts-
burgh Board could have quite properly filed an unfair practice charge
with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board against the PFT, as
provided for in the Act.49 Their failure to do so suggests a fear that
such a course of action might have backfired. It is submitted the Board
was wary that the Labor Relations Board might have issued an order
declaring certain alleged management prerogatives to be within the
scope of "terms and conditions of employment" to which the manda-
tory duty to bargain would then attach.
The plausability of this view is reinforced by a warning recently
issued by Fred M. Heddinger, a spokesman for the Pennsylvania
School Board Association, in which he cautioned that "School boards
and school administrators need to ascertain that they do not, either
inadvertently or deliberately extend the scope of bargaining beyond
that which is mandated."'50 An implicit corollary to this could be that
everything other than wages and fringe benefits should be considered
"an inherent management right" until adjudicated otherwise. In re-
sponse, the Pennsylvania State Education Association, a teacher group,
has recently brought suit in Harrisburg against the State College School
District to determine precisely what items are bargainable. 51 Certainly
the beginning of a body of case law on this point is a welcome develop-
ment. However, it will not resolve the basic policy question of whether
a teacher organization should have a voice in the formulation of school
board policy. It is submitted that such a recognition is the ultimate
solution to the scope of bargaining in public education.
The basic reasons why the Pittsburgh negotiations never got off dead
48. National Labor Relations Board v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corporation,
356 U.S. 342 (1958).
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1201(b)(3) and .1302 (Supp. 1971).
50. Heddinger, Negotiations Seminar on Act 195, A Review of Act 195 (Pennsylvania
School Boards Association, Harrisburg, Pa. 1970).
51. Pittsburgh Press, Feb. 23, 1971, at 15, col. 1.
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center until after the strike commenced, and why mediation was never
invoked, should now be clear. The main stumbling blocks to progress
lay in the area of educational reforms, most of which, at least arguably,
fell within the permissive area of negotiation. Disagreement in this
area was largely a matter of philosophy and hence not amenable to
mediation and fact-finding. The stimulus of a bargaining order, which
was available to the Board, was fraught with the danger that it might
result in the loss of a few alleged management rights.
Surprisingly enough, economic issues were not a controlling factor
in the Pittsburgh dispute, and were certainly not a factor blocking
mediation. After the PFT had painfully won its minimal educational
demands, they fairly quickly came to agreement with the Board on a
wage package which increased starting salaries $600 a year and gave
greater benefits to tenured teachers. 52 Experience with the mandatory
arbitration provisions of the Pennsylvania Police and Firemen's Act of
196853 also indicates that this area may not pose as much of a problem
as might be expected.5 However, the inclination to "pass the buck"
to the taxpayer in these instances must be taken into consideration.
ABUSE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE Acr
The PFT led an illegal ten-day strike in March of 1968, and struck
again in 1971 in violation of Section 1002 of Act 195 which mandates
mediation and fact-finding before such recourse. In neither instance
were any sanctions imposed on the union. With regard to the 1971
strike, because of Act 195's applicability (the PFT's "150 day" argument
notwithstanding), grave questions are raised as to its effectiveness. A law
whose sanctions are impotent is equivalent to no law at all, a situation
declared intolerable by all concerned prior to the enactment of Act 195.
The first question which must be asked is whether the Act's pro-
hibitive provisions are valid on their face. In this regard, section 1004
declares that an unfair practice by a public employer shall not be a
defense to a prohibited strike.55 Under section 1002 the employer can
obtain injunctive relief against such a strike.5 6 In contrast, the Penn-
sylvania Anti-Injunction Act specifically forbids injunctive relief to
52. Id. Jan. 18, 1971, at 13, col. 1.
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.10 (Supp. 1971).
54. For a general discussion see Loewenberg, Compulsory Arbitration and the Arbitra-
tor, 25 ARB. J. (NS.) 260 (1970).
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1004 (Supp. 1971).
56. Id. § 1101.1002.
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parties who have "failed to comply with any obligation imposed by
law... or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such
dispute, . . . or has violated the public policy as declared in section
two."15 7 Although Act 195 is the controlling statute in the field of public
employment, there is some question as to whether a court might never-
theless decline to exercise its equitable jurisdiction in such a dispute.
In 1968, in what has become known as the Holland School Dispute,8
the Michigan Supreme Court dissolved a lower court injunction en-
tered against a strike which was in violation of the applicable public
employe law59 because of proof of the school board's refusal to bargain
in good faith, and failure to demonstrate irreparable harm to the pub-
lic. This is not to say that the "clean hands doctrine" 60 automatically
nullifies section 1004 of Act 195, but in light of the Michigan ruling,
the possibility should be taken into consideration by those boards which
might some day seek to invoke it.
However, even if the Pennsylvania judiciary would view a Holland-
type argument favorably, the struck employer who was guilty of unfair
practices might still prevail by reason of section 1003.61 The possible
ramifications of this section are evident when viewed in the context of
the Pittsburgh dispute. Let us assume that the strike was in violation
of the Act, and that the Board was bargaining in bad faith in re-
fusing to discuss certain educational items with the PFT which can
easily be construed as conditions of employment, e.g., class size. The
Holland reasoning would seem to apply and validate the strike. How-
ever, it is hard to argue against the proposition that depriving 73,000
school children of the educational experience for two full weeks is a
clear and present danger to the welfare of the public. Here again, the
57. Id. § 206K (1964).
58. School District for the City of Holland, Ottawa and Allegan Counties v. Holland
Educational Association, 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
59. Public Employee Relations Act, MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. §§ 423.201-.254 (1967).
60. The injunction is a traditional equitable remedy. Equitable relief can only be
invoked when the normal remedy at law is inadequate, i.e., when damages would not
adequately recompense an employer for the results of an illegal strike. However, the law
will not bend to this extent when the moving party is also a wrongdoer (does not have
"clean hands").
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Supp. 1971):
If a strike by public employes occurs after the collective bargaining processes set
forth in sections 801 and 802 of Article VIII of this act have been completely uti-
lized and exhausted, it shall not be prohibited unless or until such a strike creates a
clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public. In
such cases the public employer shall initiate in the court of common pleas of the
jurisdiction where such strike occurs, an action for equitable relief including but not
limited to appropriate injunctions and shall be entitled to such relief if the court
finds that the strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety
or welfare of the public.
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overly broad language of Act 195 comes back to haunt us. Absent
solid guidelines, the "gut" issue becomes simply what degree of dis-
ruption our society is willing to endure in order to facilitate the
bargaining rights of its public employes. Theoretically, the public in-
terest should be paramount, since that is where the greatest equities
lie. But does that mean that the more important the public employer
is in terms of size and necessity of function, the more flagrant he may
be in abusing the bargaining process and still have the law on his side?
Even the liberal court in Holland did not imply as much.62 Perhaps
this is a dilemma which not even the most enlightened public employe
statute could rectify. When legitimate public and private interests
clash, necessity might indeed dictate that the latter be sacrificed in the
interests of the former. However, the parties should at least be able to
know in advance if they fit into this category. It is submitted that the
Act should be amended to enable the parties to petition a court of
common pleas for an initial determination of whether a work stoppage
in their bargaining unit would constitute a clear and present danger
to the public. If decided affirmatively, binding arbitration would attach
in lieu of a strike with appropriate sanctions if disregarded. Hopefully,
such a procedure would do much to insure the maintenance of a just
and equitable labor peace in the public sector. Certainly the mere
granting of injunctions under section 1003 does not address this basic
concern.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROHIBITIVE PROVISIONS
Assuming that the law and the equities are on the side of the public
employer, the substantial penality provisions of the Act would seem
to be a more than an adequate deterrent to illegal concerted activi-
ties.6 However, the Act does contain one fatal provision which in
practice allows a powerful union like the PFT to flout the law without
fear of reprisal. Section 1010 states:
Nothing in this article shall prevent the parties from voluntarily
requesting the court for a diminution or suspension of any fines
or penalties imposed. Any requests by employe representatives for
such participation by the public employer shall be subject to the
requirements of "meet and discuss." 64
62. See note 58.
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1001-.1009 (Supp. 1971).
64. Id. § 1101.1010.
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This provision can be characterized as the Achilles heel of amnesty
in the Act. In practice it negates the deterrent effect of the penalty
sections on unions which are powerful enough to cripple a public em-
ployer by means of an illegal strike, and then refuse to settle unless
their demands are acceded to and amnesty granted. Since the public
employer's primary concern is with settling the dispute and getting
the strikers back on the job, the amnesty demand is usually granted,
either expressly or by implication. In the instant case, the PFT had
shut down the entire Pittsburgh Public School System for two weeks
without resort to mediation, and yet there was not a hint of judicial
recourse by the Board. after the January settlement. The ineffective-
ness of the injunction as a tool in this particular dispute is seen by the
fact that the 14-day strike was past history before a hearing could be
held on the Board's request, at which time the remedy was moot.65
Because of the compelling need by public school employers for the
skilled services of their teaching personnel, upon whom they must rely
for cooperation in the execution of board policy, it is most unrealistic
to rely on permissive judicial enforcement of the sanctions of Act 195.
The suggestion made in analyzing the similar Michigan statute, that
enforcement powers be invested in a board (such as the Pa. Labor
Relations Board) with the power to assess fines for prohibited activity,
independent of the requests of the disputants, seems to be the only
logical alternative."6 Initial responsibility for enforcement should not
be thrust on those most vulnerable to the overbearing pressures of the
Act's prospective violators.
CONCLUSION
The Pittsburgh dispute portends an ominous future for teacher-
school board collective bargaining under the new Pennsylvania Public
Employe Relations Act. One difficulty involves the possible rights
of minority unions, which might be compromised by the dues check-
off provisions allowed by section 705. More importantly, the scope
of mandatory bargaining delimited by section 701 is unrealistically
narrow when viewed in the context of negotiations between represen-
tatives of professional teaching personnel and their superiors concern-
ing conditions intimately affecting the teaching environment. This
65. Pittsburgh Press, Jan. 18, 1971, at 13, col. 1-2.
66. Comment, Collective Bargaining for Public Employees and the Prevention of
Strikes in the Public Sector, 68 MicH. L. Rav. 260, 269 (1969).
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fundamental philosophical dispute over what is bargainable has greatly
reduced the value of mediation and fact-finding as a means of conflict
resolution.
With respect to the Act's prohibitions and remedies, section 1003's
allowance of injunctions against prohibited strikes, regardless of em-
ployer conduct, appears dubious in light of traditional equitable con-
cepts relating to the granting of injunctive relief. The Holland School
Dispute demonstrated that even in the face of a clear violation of an
applicable public employe statute, the granting of an injunction to the
employer guilty of unfair labor practices is far from automatic.
Further uncertainty is thrust into the Act's implementation by reason
of section 1003's prohibition of strikes which pose a clear and present
danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public. A review
procedure to establish guidelines as to which strikes fall within the
prohibition is urgently needed. Binding arbitration can then be in-
voked to assure a just settlement without the effects of a crippling work
stoppage.
The effectiveness of any piece of legislation aimed at channeling
human conduct into certain approved patterns must in the long run
depend upon the effectiveness of its sanctions. Act 195's penalty pro-
visions, while imposing on their face, are undercut by section 1010.
This section allows powerful unions which violate the Act to extort
amnesty from their adversaries. Responsibility for initiating judicial
sanctions should not rest with the public employers themselves. An
independent board should be invested with the sole power of imple-
menting the Act's sanctions.
Act 195 as it presently stands is in many respects unequal to the task
of protecting the public interest while insuring labor peace between
boards and the various teacher organizations whose members staff their
schools. Revision of the Act is a compelling necessity which cannot long
be delayed if we are to avoid the persistent recurrence of unnecessary
strife in this most critical area of public employment.
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